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Beyond breach of confidence: an Irish eye on English and Scottish 
privacy law 
Daithí Mac Síthigh1 
1. Introduction
This article is based on comparative comments (with special attention paid to 
Irish law) offered at a seminar2 in response to papers presented by Prof. 
Paula Giliker3 and Prof. Elspeth Christie Reid.4 It is first argued that a 
continuing uncertainty regarding the role of statute in relation to privacy is 
common to the development of doctrines in both England and Scotland, with 
similar anxieties present in other jurisdictions. In the absence of statutory 
clarity, the questions arising out of debate on the nature of the cause of 
action, and the consequences of variation in definitions of ‘privacy’, are 
considered. The relationship between the evolution of breach of confidence 
and the human rights framework is also noted. Finally, the prospects for law 
reform and/or convergence across jurisdictions in the UK are assessed.  
2. The role of statute
Giliker recalls the debating of the Human Rights Bill and the infamous promise 
that the Bill did not constitute statutory controls on the press. But as also 
pointed out, it was on the same record that the Government expected that the 
courts would be able to ‘fashion a common law right to privacy’. The present-
day debate on the implementation of the recommendations of the Leveson 
inquiry has been characterised by similar questions. Government and others 
have spent energy crafting a legal form that would be enforceable and 
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meaningful without being labelled as ‘statutory’. In this situation, the route of 
proposing a Royal Charter with a modified form of amendment,5 plays the role 
of being sufficiently ‘non-statutory’ to soothe concerns about ‘statutory 
regulation’, as the expectation that the courts would use one statute to 
develop the common law did before it. The question long predates the Human 
Rights Act, though; in Scotland, the Scottish Law Commission considered the 
law on breach of confidence in 1973. It did not find in favour of or against a 
statutory approach, although it did draft a bill.6  
The question of whether the law of privacy should be put on a statutory basis 
has also been considered of late, in a more careful way, in other jurisdictions. 
In Ireland, the law on privacy is based on a combination of the constitutional 
right of privacy under article 40.3, and the Irish doctrine that breach of 
constitutional rights (in some circumstances by non-State actors) can be the 
subject of an action against the infringing party. A Privacy Bill proposed in 
2006, after a report,7 would have codified and amended the evolving doctrine. 
It was heavily criticised by the media and by some scholars, and ultimately the 
Government of the day decided to proceed with reforms to defamation law 
(including a new Press Council) and defer further consideration of privacy law 
to a later point.8 However, this proposal has been considered from time to 
time since then by successive Ministers (across governments), typically in 
reaction to allegations of media malpractice.9  
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In New Zealand, the matter was studied in some detail by the Law 
Commission, but in its four-volume report, its conclusion regarding civil 
actions (in 2010) was that judicial development should be allowed to continue 
and that codification was not necessary.10 The Law Commission also argued 
that ‘there is a privacy tort, or something equivalent to it, in Europe and the 
United Kingdom, some provinces in Canada and the United States’ (as well 
as proposals in Australia).11 In the 2004 Hosking v Runting decision, the Court 
of Appeal had already argued that it was ‘legally preferable and better for 
society’s understanding’ for there to be a clear privacy cause of action.12  
The curious development of the Irish action should be considered in more 
detail, so as to identify those features unique to Irish constitutional practice 
and those relevant to other jurisdictions. The action is founded on two 
principles: (a) the recognition over the space of a few months in the early 
1970s by the Supreme Court that courts can grant a remedy for breach of 
constitutional rights against the State13 or against a private party (in Meskill),14 
and (b) the identification of privacy as one of the personal rights protected by 
article 40 in the McGee15 decision (challenging the prohibition of 
contraception). McGee is applied to a more recognisable form of privacy claim 
in Kennedy,16 where journalists successfully argued in a claim against the 
State that their constitutional rights had been breached by interception of their 
telephone calls, and were awarded damages of £50,000.17 It was soon 
clarified that, for the purposes of limitation and damages, actions of this 
nature were treated as if they were torts.18 It was not until much more 
recently, though, that a direct action against a non-State actor for breach of 
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privacy was successful; although the elements were all there, a suitable case 
had not been before the court.19  
The past decade has seen a flurry of privacy-related cases, against the 
State20 and against others. Successful actions against non-State actors 
include the award of €115,000 against a property-owner who secretly filmed 
tenants21 and, in the fully-reported High Court decision in Herrity v Associated 
Newspapers, €90,000 (including €30,000 in punitive or exemplary damages) 
against a newspaper which published illegally-recorded telephone 
conversations.22 Cases have also dealt with applications for injunctions.23 This 
has all been achieved without recourse to breach of confidence, but ironically 
not confirmed until after the English developments, despite the much clearer 
legal basis. Each of these cases see reference to Convention decisions (and 
to some English decisions under the new approach), but the availability of the 
constitutional action has meant that breach of confidence, as a doctrine, is of 
little relevance. 
3. The nature of the cause of action 
The development in England of breach of confidence into an action for misuse 
of private information is often described as a ‘shift in the centre of gravity’.24 
However, the new action still has associated with it some unanswered 
questions regarding its juridical status or classification. For example, whether 
the action is a tort for the purposes of international private law is considered in 
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Douglas v Hello (no 3).25 This decision was made on the basis of s 9(1) 
Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. Further 
questions will arise; perhaps the provision of the Rome II Regulation that ‘non-
contractual obligations arising out of violations of privacy and rights relating to 
personality, including defamation’26 are excluded from its application. 
However, in this section, two further questions are highlighted: damages, and 
legal origins. 
The matter of damages has been the subject of some development in 
England. Giliker highlights the questions arising out of the position being 
taken so far that exemplary damages are unavailable.27 This too is affected or 
at least potentially recast by the implementation of Leveson’s report.28 The 
proposed incentives for participation in self-regulation include the permitting of 
exemplary damages in respect of a number of actions (including ‘breach of 
confidence’ and ‘misuse of private information’), with publishers being able to 
avoid this prospect through participation in a regulatory scheme.29 Although 
concerns have been raised that exemplary damages against publishers raise 
questions of compatibility with article 10 ECHR,30 recall that exemplary 
damages are already granted in (constitutional) privacy actions under Irish 
law. In Scotland, the absence of exemplary damages meant that Leveson’s 
report created unforeseen problems in relation to Scots law, becoming the 
subject of a separate review commissioned by the Scottish government.31 
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Finding alternative sources for emerging problems continues to be a feature 
of privacy law. For instance, the links drawn between modern cases and the 
older actio iniuriarum has been an ongoing concern in Scots law.32 Whitty 
argues that the actio iniuriarum was potentially applicable and useful for a 
number of emerging privacy-like matters.33 (This appeared to be accepted, 
without reference to Whitty, in Stevens v Yorkhill34). Reid has argued, 
however, that links in legal origins might not be a ‘sustainable model for the 
modern development of personality rights protection’, particularly given the 
requirement of malice and the lack of the type of development seen in South 
African under this heading.35 
It was therefore especially interesting that, in the Irish decision in Sullivan v 
Boylan (considered in more detail below) in 2013, Hogan J pointed to how the 
matters before him would have been actionable under Roman law,36 and that 
continental civil codes often permitted an actio iniuriarum where conduct of 
this nature occurred. Hogan J added that in some jurisdictions, human rights 
provisions of national constitutions were also relevant (highlighting in 
particular personal rights and human dignity)37 He concluded: 
‘All of this is merely to say that the common law might well yet develop 
unaided to match its civilian counterparts so that in time that the law of 
nuisance and the rule in Wilkinson v Downton [two possible existing 
remedies, which were not applicable to this case] would be regarded 
as just distinct sub-rules of a more general tort which protected human 
dignity and the person.’ 38 
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Hogan J’s parting shot was that, but for (in part) the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997 in England, there could have been similar English 
developments. This observation can be linked with the discussion in the 
opening part of this article, on the merits and demerits of statutory 
intervention, and the idea that limited statutory change puts a ceiling on the 
extension of privacy law rather than encourages it. 
4. The role of the Convention 
The indirect horizontal effect of the ECHR, through the Human Rights Act, has 
contributed to the development of English privacy law. This is not just a point 
of general human rights adjudication or interpretation, though. Compare the 
scope of development with that of other Convention provisions. The 
opportunities to argue that a private party has infringed freedom of expression 
or assembly are famously limited and underdeveloped.39 Giliker’s discussion 
of how the new tort takes its content from articles 8 and 10 (which she 
compares with the normal way in which English torts develop)40 is a reminder 
that article 8 is the basis of wide change or recasting in England; take for the 
example the way that the restraint of publicity regarding a case in order to 
protect a child is now taken directly from the Convention, in place of inherent 
jurisdiction.41 
Reid draws the attention of the reader to White v Dickson42 and how it 
engaged a debate on the relationship between reputation and privacy.43 She 
also calls into question, in the context of damages, the use of the Stair 
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Memorial Encyclopaedia by Lord Hope, where a specific passage on ‘fame, 
reputation and honour’ is not reproduced.44 It can be added that the 
importance of this material is of wider interest in human rights law. One of the 
areas of development (and academic critique) in ECHR ‘media’ law is the 
status of reputation as something protected under article 8 (as compared with 
being one of the ‘rights of others’ potentially supporting a restriction on 
freedom of expression, under article 10(2)). This debate has ebbed and 
flowed in the courts,45 and been the subject of historical analysis,46 doctrinal 
review47 and consideration from the point of view of social psychology.48 As 
such, there is evidence from both Scotland and England that the role of the 
Convention in encouraging or constraining how the available causes of 
actions develop is a question of the content of the action as well as its legal 
form. 
5. More than one type of privacy 
Existing sub-definitions of privacy can be used to test both the extent of the 
development of breach of confidence in England and Scotland, and the way in 
which issues not yet before a court might proceed. It is well known how the 
US tort of privacy takes four forms: intrusion, appropriation, unreasonable 
publicity, and ‘false light’.49 Reid argues that private information presents a not 
unreasonable challenge in Scotland because the centre of gravity was already 
suitably situated as being based on ‘secrets’, rather than ‘confidence’ as in 
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England.50 However, publicity rights will prove more difficult to ‘translate’ to 
Scots law.51 
In New Zealand, Hosking has recently been the subject of an important 
extension in C v Holland52 – one which may give some support to those who 
fear that once privacy is established in private law, courts can and will develop 
it beyond the initial acceptance. The case also demonstrates the importance 
of the origins of the law on privacy. The defence had argued that 
‘There is no support for such a tort of simple intrusion into privacy in other 
common law jurisdictions, such as Australia and the United Kingdom. To 
the extent that there is support for such a tort, it derives from genuinely 
foreign constitutional arrangements, for example in the United States and 
Canada’  
However, the court responded that the New Zealand Bill of Rights ‘should not 
become dominated by formal proprietary notions given the universal nature of 
the rights it protects’. It also turned to recent developments in Canada, where 
the Ontario Court of Appeal had found a right of action for intrusion upon 
seclusion.53 Recall also that the New Zealand Law Commission had 
deliberately decided to leave the matter open in its post-Hosking report. 
Recently, the importance of the flexibility provided by the Irish Constitution 
became apparent once more. In Sullivan v Boylan,54 discussed above in the 
context of Roman and continental influences, Hogan J awarded damages 
(€15,000, plus €7,500 in exemplary damages) against a debt collector for 
intrusive, harassing behaviour against a debtor. Although it is the established 
approach that an action on the basis of the Constitution is not appropriate if 
there is a suitable existing cause of action available to an applicant,55 Hogan J 
found that in this case, neither the common law of nuisance nor the rule in 
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Wilkinson v Downton (intentional infliction of mental shock) were sufficient to 
protect the (infringed) constitutional rights of the applicant. In an earlier 
decision as part of the same proceedings (regarding an interim remedy), 
Hogan had assessed the constitutional text,56 pointing to the Irish-language 
version (‘is slán do gach saoránach a ionad cónaite’ – slán (security or safety) 
used where ‘inviolable’ is used in English) in order to highlight the purpose of 
the right, even where a dwelling had not been, in a literal sense, entered. 
If the legislative bodies responsible for English and Scots law were concerned 
about these developments, they could act to define the scope of the action (as 
long as this remained consistent with the Convention). If media interests 
concerned about the ‘creep’ of privacy law wanted to do something, they 
might find themselves advocating what they have opposed for so long: a 
statute.  
6. Conclusion  
Of late, the attention of media law practitioners has turned to the position of 
Northern Ireland. Differences between defamation law in England and 
Scotland are known,57 but until now there were few differences of any import 
between the defamation law of England and of Northern Ireland. This is no 
longer the case. This is because the UK parliament has adopted a new 
Defamation Act, but none of it extends to Northern Ireland (and little of it to 
Scotland).58 Furthermore, there is no sign that either the Northern Ireland 
Assembly or the Westminster parliament intends to act. As such, the changes 
to defamation law (including some new statutory defences) applicable in 
England (often perceived as defendant-friendly) cannot be assumed to be 
applicable in Northern Ireland. Applicants may therefore choose to initiate 
action in Belfast, if concerned that the new definitions or defences might 
hinder their chances had the claim been brought in England. This situation 
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serves as a reminder of a trivial point: differences between jurisdictions may 
be exploited for strategic purposes. 
Reid previously wondered whether the sparse case law on confidentiality 
under Scots law was a result of ‘the Scots (having) few secrets or (being) 
good at keeping them’.59 The present author is not qualified to answer this 
question, but a serious issue is raised by it. In other areas of divergence 
between Scots and English law in the media, journalistic and editorial practice 
has played the role of ensuring de facto harmonisation. (An example is the 
voluntary non-disclosure of the names of alleged victims of sexual offences in 
Scotland, achieving in respect of Scottish proceedings the same effect as the 
Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 does in respect of those in England 
and Wales). But of course, the nature of secrecy and confidentiality is at least 
in part cultural. The willingness (or otherwise) of potential litigants to highlight 
these matters, and the approach to question of risk and ethics by journalists, 
cannot but affect the nature and number of cases brought forward. It can 
therefore be a long time before, in a small jurisdiction, these matters are truly 
put to the test. 
Perceived differences between media law in England and Scotland were 
brought before a wide audience when the Glasgow-based Sunday Herald 
identified (in its print edition, circulating within Scotland) the footballer Ryan 
Giggs as being the subject of an injunction under English law as part of 
privacy proceedings he had instigated. The injunction60 was without force in 
Scotland,61 although making it enforceable would not have been particularly 
difficult.62 Even so, the idea that the intended result of the English injunction 
could be frustrated so easily was held up either as evidence of a need to offer 
greater protection to applicants, or proof of the futility of trying to suppress 
information in the cross-border age of the Internet. A parliamentary committee 
has also heard evidence of the implications in terms of cost and speed of 
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enforcing injunctions across jurisdictions and recommended action be taken 
to ensure that interim injunctions are enforceable in all UK jurisdictions.63 
In her contribution to this issue, Reid is rightly sceptical about the way in 
which the House of Lords and the Court of Session dealt with the perceived 
gap in Scots law in respect of breach of confidence.64 This is echoed by 
Giliker’s finding that the English developments reflect a lack of conceptual 
coherence, primarily as a result of how the cause of action is classified.65 
What these two arguments share is a recognition that the emphasis has been 
placed on getting the right result, without due regard either for the intellectual 
coherence of the law (of interest to some) or for the longer-term 
consequences of making an action possible without due regard for important 
features like remedies, procedures, liability, and scope (of interest to all). The 
alternative tradition is one rooted in a combination of human rights law and 
Roman concepts of dignity, with courts being secure in the existence of a right 
so as to find themselves searching for a suitable remedy. This is why the Irish 
doctrines that made the modern privacy claim possible emerged in the first 
place, and a key feature of the New Zealand and Ontario decisions regarding 
intrusion. Hogan J’s twinned reference to the actio iniuriarum and 
constitutional rights, an unusual and thoughtful approach in an Irish decision, 
suggests that English and Scottish developments might well inform one 
another as the realisation of article 8 continues – even if parliamentary 
interest remains minimal. 
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